Historical Debate #1

[Flax]

For fun, because I love history and because, well these boards are pretty much dead, I will start a series of historical debates. The topic of this one is:

Who is the Greatest General of the Classical Times? (4000 B.C. to 476 A.D.)

A few rules:

- You have to explain why the man you chose is the greatest general of that era.
- You have to respect opinions of others, yes, even those less informed than you. Anyhow, a kind rebuttal makes you seems much smarter than saying someone is a flat out idiot.
- Anyone is welcome in this debates, as long as you provide a SERIOUS contribution, and not some lame joke.

[Banzai Kamikaze]

Aright. I must first say I'm not aware of all the generals of this period, and that defining how a general is "Great" is a debate in itself.

There must be tons of amazing generals that have been forgotten by History, because of their lack of success, lack of ressources, lack of impact on History, etc. Furthermore, defining what is a "General" is again another subject for debate. There is a major difference between Strategists and Tacticians. Thankfully, most generals from classical times acted as both.

An interesting fact is that most "great generals" are those that were faced with overwhelming odds. History tends to forget those that succeeded while having odds in their favor, since it doesn't show the full extent of their abilities. Therefore, a lot of great "conquerors" are not considered "great generals". Attila the Hun, is one of those "great conquerors" that didn't show any particularly amazing tactical talent, in my opinion.

Ok, as for my choice, here would be my "nominees": Hannibal Barca, Julius Caesar, Alexander the Great, Scipio Africanus. They are, in my opinion, both great strategists and tacticians.

I'm sure I'm forgetting some late era generals, but I don't know much about them.

All right, so my final choice is the following:

Hannibal Barca

I won't go into details as to why he is my choice. He redefined the concepts of military tactics, his legacy is still affecting generals' decisions today. He proved to be invincible in open combat, even with inferior ressources, in a hostile territory, faced with a very competent opponent.

His masterful use of the strengths AND weaknesses of his army was rarely reproduced. Even weak units of his army were essential to his "deceitful" tactics. He would be one of the first generals to use his cavalry with a decisive impact on the battlefield.

While his tactics were undeniably near perfect, his strategy of invasion of Italy proved to be less so, unfortunately. However, I would doubt any general in History would have fared better.

It took 14 years for a very competent Roman General, Scipio Africanus, to finally save Rome. However, Hannibal's army at this point was tired, poorly reinforced, and was faced with a superior cavalry force for the first time in the Second Punic War. Scipio used Hannibal's tactics against him, as if learning from him, and even then, the battle of Zama was a close one.

Strangely, later roman generals would forget all about Hannibal's masterful use of his cavalry and concentrate on their infantry. This would prove to be a terrible mistake much later...

Feel free to comment and criticize. The next people to choose their own greatest general should also explain why Hannibal wasn't better than them .

[Flax]

Seems you beated me to the first post! My choice is a little known general, but great nonetheless, Epaminondas (418 B.C. - 362 B.C.).

Epaminondas was a Theban General, a master of tactics, a philosopher, a cunning politician and a man of impeccable character.

Already in his youth he was at the center of a plot to overthrow the Spartan government in Thebes, which succeeded and led to the creation of the Boeotian Confederation.(With Thebes at its center)

Years later (371 B.C. ) he was elected as Boeotarch (general), which lasted for a period of one year. When he was elected the Thebans had been fighting Sparta to a standstill, this changed with Epaminondas. At Leuctra he took 6000 men against the spartan army of King Cleombrutus which numbered 10000 men, 700 of them Spartiates, Sparta's elite.

Epaminondas knew he could not win a conventional battle and so he decided to place his best troops, the Sacred Band at his left flank of his phalanx, instead of the traditional right. He also knew he could not match the length of the spartan lines without thinning his ranks. He decided instead to deepen the ranks on his left flank (up to 50 man of dept) and ordered his right flank to engage a fighting retreat with the enemy thus delaying them.

The result was a crushing defeat at Leuctra for the Spartans. 4000 Peloponnesians were killed, amongst them 400 of the 700 Spartiates. The Boeotians lost only 300 men.

Capitalizing on his victory he entered the Peloponnese the next year determined to shatter Sparta's power once and for all. He came to the rescue of Mantinea, a city who had doubts about its « alliance » with Sparta, then founded Megalopolis and formed the Arcadian League (modeled on the Boeotian Confederation). He then crossed the frontier of Sparta, the Evrotas River, something no hostile army had ever been able to pull off at that time. The spartan response was to cower in their city, while Epaminondas ravaged their countryside and then refunded the city of Messene (the territory of Messenia had been conquered by Sparta over 200 years before). He issued a call to all Messenian exiles in Greece to rebuild their homeland. In a few months, Epaminondas had created two powers to oppose Sparta, disrupted Sparta's economy and tarnished the name of Sparta.

In 369 B.C. he returned to the Peloponnese winning the city of Sicyon over to an Alliance with Thebes. The next year he wasn't elected, for the first and only time between the battle of Leuctra and his death. This same year he marched as a common soldier into Thessaly to rescue Pelopidas, imprisoned while serving as an ambassador for Thebes. The expedition culminated in the retreat of the Theban forces and Epaminondas was reinstated and led the army right back to Thessaly, he then outmaneuvered the Thessalians and secured the release of Pelopidas without a fight.

In 366 B.C. after a failed peace conference at Thebes, he returned to the Peloponnese for a third time. There no army dared challenge him in the field, but his alliances in this area started to crumble with the return of pro-Sparta aristocrats. Slowly the Theban alliance fell to pieces and rallied behind Sparta, with the exception of the Messenians.

In response to the growing opposition to Theban dominance, Epaminondas returned to the Peloponnese one last time in 362 B.C. This, after much running around across the region, led to the Battle of Mantinea, the largest hoplite battle in Greek history. Facing him and his few allies stood the Mantineans, the Spartans, the Athenians and many of their allies. Both armies numbered between 20000 and 30000. Here, Epaminondas used the same tactics as in the battle of Leuctra. Thus he placed the Thebans at the left flank opposite to the Spartans, Mantineans and their allies and used his cavalry, supported by infantry, to cover his flank. With this troop placement he hoped to win a quick victory in the cavalry engagements and begin a rout of the enemy phalanx.

The battle unfolded as Epaminondas had planned. The stronger forces on the wings drove back the Athenian and Mantinean cavalry opposite them and began to attack the flanks of the enemy phalanx. In the hoplite battle, the issue briefly hung in the balance, but then the Thebans on the left broke through against the Spartans, and the entire enemy phalanx was put to flight. It seemed that another decisive Theban victory on the model of Leuctra was about to unfold until, as the victorious Thebans set off in pursuit of their fleeing opponents, Epaminondas was mortally wounded. He died shortly thereafter.

Dying, Epaminondas asked his fellow Thebans to make peace because there was no one left to lead them. They did what he asked, unable to capitalize on his brilliant victory at Mantinea and Thebes quickly faded from dominance. 27 years after the general's death the city would be completely raised by Alexander the Great in response to a revolt.

So, why is this man in my opinion the greatest general in classical times? Like BanzaiKamikaze said before me, defining « greatest » and « general » could be a debate unto itself, so there are no absolutes. Nevertheless, Epaminondas is at least a very strong contender for the title. At Leuctra and Mantinea proved his tactical genius, as he drastically changed how hoplite battles were fought and beated the famed Spartans many times, notably at Leuctra, with an inferior force. On the matter of strategy, he boxed in Sparta itself, crippling the city without even a fight. Yet unlike many generals he was also a cunning politician and negotiator. He secured many alliances which strengthened the influence of Thebes, he secured the release of his friend Pelopidas without even a fight and managed to stay elected all of the decade following the battle of Leuctra, save for one year. After his first foray into the Peloponnese he was accused by his political enemies of stretching his term for longer than the one year for which he was elected. He was guilty of such a crime but requested simply that, if he was to be executed, the inscription regarding the verdict read:

« Epaminondas was punished by the Thebans with death, because he obliged them to overthrow the Lacedaemonians at Leuctra, whom, before he was general, none of the Boeotians durst look upon in the field, and because he not only, by one battle, rescued Thebes from destruction, but also secured liberty for all Greece, and brought the power of both people to such a condition, that the Thebans attacked Sparta, and the Lacedaemonians were content if they could save their lives; nor did he cease to prosecute the war, till, after settling Messene, he shut up Sparta with a close siege. »

In the face of this response the jury broke into laughter and the charges were dropped. Need I say he was reelected as Boeotarch for the next year?

Beyond being all of that, he was also a philosopher and a man of impeccable character. In pure Pythagorean tradition he gave freely to his friends and encourage them to to likewise with each other. He was also incorruptible, refusing amongst others a bribe from a Persian ambassador. Furthermore he was praised by his contemporaries for disdaining material wealth, even if for a decade he was the most influential man in Greece.

Finally, it is said that Epaminondas might have been a teacher to Phillip of Macedon, as Phillip in his youth was a hostage in Thebes in the time of Epaminondas and used in his army many of the tactical changes implemented by the Theban general.
The great orator Cicero eulogized him as « the first man, in my judgment, of Greece ». Lastly, in his book, The Soul of Battle, Victor Davis Hanson proclaimed him one of the three greatest generals who fought against tyranny and for freedom, the other two being Sherman and Patton.

In conclusion, Epaminondas has all the trappings of a truly great man and he his more than just a general. He almost singlehandedly catapulted Thebes from a defiant rebel to the strongest power in Greece. While it is said that Greece did not change much after all his efforts, I believe this was caused by his premature death at Manatea. If anyone could have hoped to unite Greece it would have been Epaminondas, armed with his innovative tactics and his undeniable political acumen he might have been able form a confederacy akin to the Boeotian confederation but for the whole of Greece.

----------------------------------------------

As for Hannibal Barca, while in my opinion the man his a greater tactician then Epaminondas (Cannae soundly proves it) he lacked the ability to capitalize on his victory. Basically Hannibal was a great leader on the battlefield but could not use his great victories to achieve something greater. Fabius Maximus proved this during his dictatorship by denying Carthaginian victories simply by refusing to meet Hannibal in a pitched battle. Only the arrogance of the Roman aristocracy at the end of Maximus' dictatorship permitted the massacre of Cannae to take place. Soon afterwards, the romans adopted the Cuncutator's (Delayer) strategy of shadowing Hannibal's army for the reminder of his stay, practicing « scorched earth » in a war of attrition. Hannibal was simply unable to outmaneuver the romans or engage them is a fight. The problem is that he was far to inclined in fighting the roman army instead of taking the fight to targets the romans could not ignore. In that, he might have been to conservative and cautious of his new « allies » in Italy. (Who would all be crushed in a brutal and bloody retribution)

Also, in my opinion Hannibal's lack of support on the home front could be interpreted as a sign of political weakness. While he is the one to have initiated the attack on roman soil, he left far too many political enemies in Carthage, with almost no one to back him up. This could explain why Carthage spared little supplies to aid him and had little so little faith in his campaign.

Finally, in my opinion, Hannibal Barca is a great tactician, a great general even, but not the greatest. He lacked the will the change the world around him. Destroying the romans in revenge for the first Punic War is as good as any motive to crush an opponent, but it lacks what truly separates great men from the rest, it lacks a vision. Epaminondas had such a vision, a vision of a free Greece united in a confederation and he fought for an ideal, one of the greatest of all time, if not the greatest, freedom.

[The Beast of Caerbannog]

Without a doubt, I have to chose Augustus.

Known in his time as Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus, and first gaining reconnaissance and respect as being the adoptive son and heir to one of the greatest military commanders of all time, Caius Julius Caesar, Augustus poved worthy of his parent, winning his first victories at the young age of 20 at Forum Gallum and Mutina against the forces of the experienced Marcus Antonius.

He followed suit by aiding Marcus Antonius in defeating Caesar's murderers during the Second Triumvirate, after which he soundly defeated both other triumvirs, Lepidus in Sicily (whith the help of his trusted commander Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa) and Marcus Antonius at the Battle of Actium.

Augustus, then in control of Rome, proved his political genius by reforming the roman government, making himself First Citizen, what historians would come to call emperor. His was the longest lasting reign of any roman leader in the 1000 years history of their rule. At the end of Augustus' life, the empire's land mass had nearly doubled.

Augustus' strength was not in his military tactics. Though he was a reasonable tactician, many men of the era were his betters in that field. His strength was instead to know which man to trust for each task and his ability to appraise skillfully the political situation in Italy (such as when he resettled the soldiers after the Triumvirate's victory over Caesar's killers). Though Augustus did not master any one area of generalship, he was able to create, lead and then disband his armies, without ever being threatened by his enemies, either through strength of arms or trickery and mutiny.